ABSTRACT This paper proposes a sparse trading model of futures prices. The model considers that nearby futures contract with liquidity plays an important role in the price recovery, and allows that far futures contract with sparse trading uses the price of nearby futures contract as a source of information. Also, it is shown whether and how liquidity may well be an influential factor for futures prices in Chinese commodity futures markets. Empirical results show strong evidence for lead-lag information transmission for fuel oil, nature rubber, and soybean, which implies sparse trading effect on futures prices.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of commodity-related securities, a variety of stochastic models have been proposed and play a central role when evaluating this kind of securities. As far as evaluation form is concerned, the majority of stochastic models for futures prices are constructed by the same affine pricing form. Nevertheless, it is well known that trading volume heavily concentrates on those contracts with shorter timeto-expiration. To explain the phenomenon of trading volume concentration, a stochastic model is developed by Bamberg and Dorfleitner (2000) , and they found that the early unwinding propensity of market participants is responsible to strong concentration in futures markets.
Obviously, due to the marked difference of liquidity which is normally ignored in traditional literature for futures contracts, one-model-for-all is not the best evaluation idea, and even causes pricing bias in sparse trading futures markets like China. Sparse trading, meaning not active trading, leads to illiquidity or low-liquidity, and opposites to active trading with high-liquidity. In those markets, it seems reasonable to assume that contract liquidity could be an important factor in shaping futures prices and build a more practical and universal model. Therefore, our paper proposes a new evaluation model from the aspect of contract maturity by significantly discriminating contract liquidity. Furthermore, we assume that far futures contract uses the price of nearby futures contract as a source of information. Movements in the price of nearby futures contract are informative, because they reflect the news about fundamentals more accurately and robustly than far ones disturbed by sparse trading.
The reasons are as follows. First of all, the price of futures contract with sparse trading is more volatile and easily disturbed by noise trading, and thus the change of the price contain less valuable information, while the nearby contracts are more robust to noise trading.
Deviations from no-arbitrage relation may trigger arbitrage trading and should be related to market liquidity because market liquidity facilitates arbitrage (Roll, et. al, 2007) . Under the arbitraging pressure, the price of far futures contract with low liquidity tends to move back towards the relation defined by nearby contract with high liquidity. As when the maturity of nearby contract falls due, far futures contract approaches to and finally transforms into nearby contract, meanwhile a new far futures contract is initiated, go round and begin again. So at any time, the nearby and far contracts group coexist. The illiquidity situation usually exists in far futures contract, absolutely different with the ''illiquidity'' acting as a channel through which monetary policy shocks are transferred (Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009 ). This kind of phenomenon in futures markets does not necessarily indicate arrival of new market information. Because of sparse trading, the size of arbitrage trading between low-and high-liquidity contracts is greatly confined. Wen et al (2017) studies sparse recovery through OLS algorithm, indicating there is a recovery system from sparse trading. Compared with the price of highliquidity contract, on which the limited arbitrage pressure can only have a finite influence in regards to the forces of supply and demand or price changes, the price of low-liquidity is more significantly impacted and tends to converge to that of high-liquidity contract.
In terms of market information transmission across futures markets, does there exist a two-way (direct and indirect) channel? If does, which group's price is in lead, i.e., what kind of contract reacts to news about fundamentals faster, low-or high-liquidity contract? It could be assumed that the price of low-liquidity contract would be more sensitive and easily responsive to new information. However, the price out-ofstep between low-and high-liquidity contract would trigger arbitrage trading, in a result, the price adjustment of lowliquidity contract originally arising from new information would be offset by arbitrage trading. Therefore, only price adjustment of high-liquidity contract caused by new information can truly reach the new equilibrium, which also helps correct the price of low-liquidity contract through the lead-lag information transmission mechanism. Wen et al. (2018) finds sharp sufficient conditions for stable recovery in K iterations from sparse signals, which can be used to validate the price relationship between high-and low-liquidity contracts from sparse trading. Back to the main concern with respect to information transmission mechanism, high-liquidity contract would react to new market information directly, and two modes may exist regarding low-liquidity contract: one is the direct information transmission synchronized with highliquidity contract, and the other is the indirect one, through which new information is absorbed by price changes of highliquidity contract firstly and then transmits to low-liquidity contract.
Under the information transmission mechanism, what are the effects of sparse trading on the no-arbitrage relation and term structure of futures contract? Hedgers and speculators are known to flight to liquidity, so the degree of liquidity is closely related to information transmission mechanism. Furthermore, the term structure of futures contract not only contains information about the fundamentals, proxied by cost of carry and convenience yield, but also the information transmission mechanism. If liquidity of far futures contract is high enough to generally guarantee the quick reaction to fundamental information in its price, and the price of high-liquidity contract does not provide additional explanations, then the mode of information transmission should be direct, and the term structure of low-liquidity futures contract would seem as an extension of that of high-liquidity contract. In another case, if the sparse trading sparse trading phenomenon is significant, and hedgers and speculators certainly prefer to high-liquidity contract, the indirect information transmission is in effect, which means that far futures contract could follow nearby high-liquidity contract in addition to responding to market information.
In traditional literatures, the main factors usually include spot price, implied interest rate and convenience yield which are assumed to follow specific stochastic processes, while contract liquidity is always neglected in the traditional evaluation models. The term structure of interest rate and convenience yield, implied by the traditional evaluation models, are a monotonous increasing/decreasing function of time to maturity. The monotonous term structure could have overestimated the effects of interest rate and convenience yield for sparse trading far futures contracts. Because the information indirectly transmitted to these contracts first travels through the contract with high liquidity, and the sparse trading of contracts would easily cause incompleteness of indirect information transmission, and finally lead to insufficient reaction of news about fundamentals. Therefore, the term structure should be modified to better describe the real markets.
In order to take liquidity factor into consideration, we divide the contracts into two groups, namely nearby futures contracts with high liquidity and far futures contracts with low liquidity. In Mainland China where commodity market is immature, the information contained by nearby high-liquidity contracts could be assumed to spread to far low-liquidity contracts. Based on the preceding analysis, our paper aims to verify whether liquidity is really an influential factor for futures prices in Chinese commodity futures markets; if does, specify how important a role the factor plays, how it shapes the pricing model among maturities, how it works through the two transmission modes, and what are the characteristics about it. The answers to these questions constitute the main contributions of our paper.
In the second section, we decompose and reconstruct the price system of commodity futures from the perspective of information transmission, and then evaluate a low-liquidity contract according to the price information of high-liquidity contract by arbitrage-free equilibrium. In the third section, we specify empirical implementation in which data description and estimation methodology are provided and four econometric models are generated. And the results are displayed in the following section along with implication analyses. The last section is our conclusion.
II. HOW DOES LIQUIDITY AFFECT FUTURES PRICING? A. THE PRICE RECOVERY OF HIGH-LIQUIDITY MATURITY
The high-liquidity futures contract has the same underlying asset and trading mechanism as the low-liquidity one, while the only difference is time to maturity which leads to different levels of liquidity. It is usually assumed in previous literatures that information set driving futures' price changes is the same to all contracts, but it is further assumed in our paper that the information transmission mechanism is unknown, and the reaction time lag of futures' price to information impulse is related to contract liquidity.
Firstly, what does the information set contain? According to the theory of storage, the information set contains price variables and macroeconomic factors, including convenience yield, spot price and interest rate. The concept of convenience yield in the theory of storage is introduced by Kaldor (1939) , Working (1949) , Telser (1958) and Brennan (1958) . Those studies explain it in terms of an embedded timing option and also that the stock of commodity provides a yield or VOLUME 6, 2018 compensation called convenience yield (δ) to stock holders, which therefore must be opposite to storage cost. In costof-carry model, spot price (x), a representative of fundamentals, is the most paramount factor and has a basic and major influence on commodity futures prices. As the other important part of inventory carrying cost, interest rate (r) is closely related to monetary policy, represents the opportunity cost of holding inventory, and plays a significant part in shaping futures prices, therefore it has been introduced into the well-known three-factor model built by Schwartz (1997) as well as Brennan (1991) , Gibson and Schwartz (1990) , and Schwartz and Smith (2000) . These factors documented by the related literatures help explain commodity futures' changes, and also are the main source of market risk. Therefore, Risk premiums attached to those factors are also mentioned in Brennan (1958) and further discussed in follow-up literatures. In Szymanowska, et.al (2014) , risk premium is decomposed into spot premium and term premium, which both affect futures prices but in a different way.
Containing all the factors discussed above and following the traditional pricing model like CCD (2005), Liu and Tang (2011) build their model bringing into anther yet not considered factor heteroskedasticity, making the most thorough and practical model at the time. As the liquidity factor we mentioned above, we are going to propose an extended model for pricing low-liquidity contracts, but for high-liquidity contracts, Liu and Tang's model works just well because liquidity won not be a problem for high-liquidity contracts. So as in Liu & Tang's model, the state variables (information set) follow a joint diffusion specified as
Where x t = ln(S t ) is the logarithm spot price, the parameter κ i and κ δ are both larger than zero and represent the degree of mean reversion to the long-run equilibrium θ i and θ δ . It is defined thatθ δ = θ δ +w andδ t = δ t +w, where w denotes the degree of heteroskedasticity, and a larger w indicates less heteroskedasticity effect on convenience yield process. In addition, stochastic processes of convenience yield and implied interest rate are assumed to be correlated, and κ δi is set to
are mutually independent increments of standard Brownian motion process under the risk-neutral measure. Secondly, how does the new information affect highliquidity contract? Adequate liquidity enhances the response capability of high-liquidity contract for new information, which will be directly transmitted and may induce price changes and volatility. Therefore, the traditional models based on the theory of storage can be used to evaluate the high-liquidity futures contract.
Liu & Tang's model combines three factors into valuation model and makes use of standard form on pricing within the affine framework (e.g., Langetieg, 1980; DK, 1996) . The following expression shows a directly transmission mechanism:
Where T h is the expiration date and τ is time to maturity, and
and A(τ ) is a monotone increasing function. Likewise, it can also be inferred that, B 0 > 0, B 2 < 0, B(τ ) < 0, and B(τ ) is a monotone decreasing function. Furthermore, the inference does not concur with our analysis in the introduction. Traditional evaluation model can only depict term structure as a monotone function that should be plausible for the highliquidity contract, but that may not be reasonable for all contracts as a whole. If it is true that the influence function across all maturity contracts is monotonic, then the longer of time to maturity of futures contract, the higher cost of holding funds, and also the larger convenience yield. However, this is not necessarily the case in real markets. Then the classic depiction should be adjusted to apply to a wider range. Now comes the question that does liquidity have anything to do with the term structure, i.e., the influence functions of interest rate and convenience yield, if it does, why it works and how.
B. PRICING FOR A LOW-LIQUIDITY MATURITY
The factor our paper most concerns is market liquidity, which attracts little attention in most valuation models of futures contracts. Deviation from no-arbitrage relation may trigger arbitrage trades and market liquidity facilitates arbitrage. Roll, Schwartz and Subrahmanyam (2007) show that Granger causality exists between the absolute index futures basis and liquidity. Their empirical findings imply that market liquidity is another important factor to futures evaluation. They also provide evidence that two-way Granger causality exists between the short-term absolute basis and liquidity, while one-way between longer-term absolute basis and liquidity, and liquidity Granger-causes longer-term absolute basis. The empirical results imply that market liquidity contains special and new information, and Granger causality shows the mechanism of information transmission amongst maturity contracts. Therefore, it is assumed that high liquidity contract leads low liquidity contract in our valuation model and is intituled as ''the leading contract''. As aiming to observe the effects brought by liquidity, the contracts will be divided into two groups according to trading volume and open interest, namely nearby futures contracts with higher liquidity and far futures contracts with lower liquidity. As for the higher liquidity contract, traditional futures pricing model is employed, such as Liu & Tang (2011); for the far futures contracts with lower liquidity, the price of high-liquidity contract is embedded as an influence factor in the valuation model instead of spot price, thus a lead-lag relation is implanted. If the embedment is statistically compatible with the price system, it in turn helps approve the rationality of the lead-lag relation and helps assess the difference brought by liquidity factor in the term structure of implied interest rate as well as of implied convenience yield in our extended model.
In order to identify the effects caused by liquidity, all contracts of specific commodity futures are divided into two groups: high-liquidity contracts (nearby contracts, leading) and low-liquidity contracts (far contracts, following). With the valuation model above, the implied interest rate process and term structure are released from the realized price of high-liquidity futures contract. As for low-liquidity contracts, the implied interest rate process and term structure will be estimated in a similar way. Under risk neutral measure, the stochastic price process of the selected leading contract (with time to maturity τ * ) is assumed as following. As we mentioned, the price of the leading contract will be considered as an influence factor besides the general three factors, and we assume that price of low-liquidity contract
For feasibility, we set the expiration date for low-liquidity contract T l > T * h , and then the stochastic processes of factors can be written as
Compared with the model for high-liquidity contracts, the main difference is the addition stochastic process of dF t and longer maturity. Where A, B and F stand for the function A(τ * ), B(τ * ), F(t, T * h ) respectively. Under arbitrage-free equilibrium condition, the partial differential equation as follows must be satisfied,
Likewise, the price of low-liquidity contract satisfies the affine form as follows,
where T = T l − t is time to maturity for low-liquidity contract, ϕ l = 1−e −µ l , µ l > 0, and f (t, r t ,δ t , x t , ln F(t, T * h )|T l ) denotes as f (t, T l ), In this way, we not only take liquidity into consideration by deducing two sets of pricing models, but also make it more persuasive by introducing the weighted approach (with ϕ l determined by µ l as the weighting factor) between spot price and the price of leading contract to determine how these two factors impact the price of low-liquidity contract.
As for the low-liquidity contract, it will not approach to maturity and converge to spot goods; instead, it will turn into high-liquidity contract. Thus we set the boundary condition as a(τ
At that time, the price of lowliquidity contract will converge to that of high-liquidity contract ln F(t, T * h ). Then use the affine price form, plug it in the close-form solution derived from the partial differential equation above and yield the following solution: Where
Based on the results above, it can be found that if 
Therefore, the embedded model is an adjusted, extended and nested model of the traditional three-factor pricing model, and it displays a more complex situation of term structure instead of the original monotonous one. Under the general situation c 1 < 0, it can be obtained that a (T ) < A(τ * ) ≤ A (T ), which means that the original term structure might very well be overestimated and should be pulled back somewhat. So for low-liquidity contract, the term structure of interest rate is lower than the classic one, while the term structure of convenience yield is higher as its influence function is negative.
III. EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION A. DATA
Our data sets consist of futures contracts of copper (CU), aluminum (AL), zinc (ZN), fuel oil (FU) and nature rubber (RU) from SHFE for the period from September 18, 2007 to July 27, 2015, and of soybean NO.1 (A) from DCE for the same timeframe. For clarity, the details about these data are displayed in the following table.
For commodities futures, these continuous contracts with different maturities are labeled as F i , i = 0, 1, 2, . . . . . . , 8, where F0 lies within the expiring month, and F1 is the closest contract to maturity besides F0, and etc. And the interval of the adjacent contracts is one month except for A, of which is two months. The specific grouping of each commodity is shown based on the average open interest and average trading volume which indicates difference in liquidity in the timeframe to form two groups, namely, high-and lowliquidity contracts group. We lose F0 for some commodities for their inactive transactions and thus assure that the time to maturity for low-liquidity contract is longer than that of highliquidity contract, agreeing with our assumption in the pricing model. Our data are collected from WIND Information which is a leading integrated service provider of financial data, information and software in china.
B. THE EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
Speaking of empirical implementation of commodity price decomposition adjusted by liquidity, some factors in valuation model are not directly observable and cause difficulty in the calibration of valuation models. Academic researchers frequently use such calibration methodologies to solve this problem as Efficient Method of Moments, Maximum Likelihood Estimation and the Kalman Filter Method. Creatively, Li and Zhang (2016) find a good way to deal with nonlinear time-fractional problems, and He and Zhang (2018) propose an effective way for iteration in Nyström Approximation. Although these state variables are not observable, they are usually assumed to follow a Markov process, so it is appropriate to apply the Kalman filter method to estimate the parameters of the valuation model. And Duffee and Stanton (2002) find that the Kalman filter is the best methodology after comparing those normally used three methods, and it is well enough to fulfill the task we need in our paper, so here Kalman filter method is adopted. In order to highlight the difference caused by liquidity factor, four models are generated here, each with some adjustments.
Model one is for high-liquidity contract only, and from the affine form we get,
ln F(t, T h ) = A(τ )r t + B(τ )δ t + C(τ ) + x t + w t
Where ln F(t, T h ) is the nature logarithm price of a contract deliverable at a certain time T h . Liquidity is not considered here. To simplify the estimation process and highlight the liquidity effect, most of the parameters estimated in model one can be used as known numbers which do not need to reestimate and plugged into Model two directly.
Model two is for low-liquidity contract whose price follows a specific leading contract with time to maturity τ * . From the affine form we get,
Where ln f (t, T l ) denotes the nature logarithm price of a lowliquidity contract delivers at time T l at time t. And ϕ l (orµ l ) is the same for different time to maturities within the lowliquidity contracts group, in other words, µ l is a constant. It means that the price of leading contract shapes the price of low-liquidity by the same percentage regardless of time to maturity. For model three, the only difference it has from model two is that µ l varies along with time to maturity, i.e., µ l is a variable. It means that the power of the price of leading contract shaping the price of low-liquidity varies along with its time to maturity.
For the above three models, all futures prices used in the Kalman filter are realized historic market data. In model four, the adjustment is made by substituting the market data with the equilibrium futures prices derived from the pricing model in the preceding part to compare the difference between the realized price data and the theoretical prices. If the results do not change much, it would be a great proof that our model works well.
Futures prices for different contract maturities relate to state variables via a measurement equation. The measurement equations in our empirical models are obtained by introducing Gaussian disturbances W t .
The measurement equation of model one is
where N is the number of contracts used in the estimation process.
The measurement equation of model two is and h 0 is the variance of F0 data, h 1 is the variance of the F1 data and etc., m and n are the number of high-and low-liquidity contract maturities separately, for instance, for AL, m=4, n=4; for CU, m=5, n=3. W t follows serially and cross-sectional uncorrelated Gaussian disturbance with mean of zeros and covariance matrix of R. The measurement equation for model three is the same as the measurement equation for model two with the adjustment discussed above.
The measurement equation of model four is
Where A(τ * ), B(τ * ) and C(τ * ) are the influence functions of the leading contract, while the others stay the same.
In Kalman filter calibration model, unobservable state variables are usually generated via the transition equation. It can be deduced under the physical measure with risk premium accounted for. When it comes to risk premium, previous empirical study has shown several ways to deal with it, to set it constant like Schwartz (1997) or let it be a linear function of the state variables, like Duffee (2002) , Duffee and Stanton (2002) , and CCD (2005). Our way to introduce risk premium is to set it as a square root of the state variables, as the way Liu and Tang (2011) did, in order to ensure jointly stochastic process under the physical measure has the affine form. In the concrete we set the risk premium vector to be
As dW Q t is independent increment of standard Brownian motion process under the risk-neutral measure, so dW Q t = dW P t + dt where superscript P means that the stochastic process is under the real-world measure. The factors' stochastic processes in real world can be written as:
According to the physical measure (P-measure) dynamics of state variables, we can obtain a discrete time version of VOLUME 6, 2018 the stochastic processes. The discrete transition equation of state variables is specified, as shown at the bottom of the next page. And V t is serially uncorrelated Gaussian disturbance vector with mean of zeros and covariance of Q t . Covariance matrix of W t is time independent, while covariance matrix of state variables Q t is time variant and conditional on previous period information. And the transition equation is applied to all four models because it only depicts the relationship among these state variables and has nothing to do with the specific data treatment.
Given the known Gaussian transition density for the state variables and the distribution for the error term of measurement equation, the likelihood function can be derived by using extended Kalman filter algorithm. We maximize the likelihood function to estimate model parameters. In this way, each factor can be expressed specifically and separately, and the effect of liquidity can easily be identified and analyzed.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The value of influence functions can be calculated as those parameters within the influence function are estimated by Kalman filtering method. And the results are illustrated in table 2.
From table 2, we find that most of these parameters estimated are statistically and significantly different from zero at 5% level, which is a good sign for them to be used in model two. The long-term mean for natural rubber is the greatest while it is least for soybean NO.1; while copper responds most quickly to deviations from its long-term mean, fuel oil responds most slowly. And the influence functions of A(τ ) and B(τ ) can easily be calculated, so the term structure can be analyzed.
Apparently, we can see that these parameters vary from different commodities. It implies that each commodity has its own implied interest rate process as well as other contained implicit processes, and their degrees of influence also depend on the specific commodity. This is the case because every commodity reacts to market information in a slightly different degree or response time despite in a general same way. As we know, interest rate is normally regarded as an exogenous factor and is modeled as stochastic process; however, the implied interest rate extracted here is not real interest rate obviously, but the reactions of commodity markets to information from currency market. As we discussed above, the information can be absorbed directly from the market and thus the response time is relatively short, and it can also be absorbed indirectly through the information released from other contracts such as the leading contract with high-liquidity, which is the matter concerned in model two. From table three, as the other parameters involved in the pricing of high-liquidity contract are set by model one, the remaining parameters are related to low-liquidity contract-the variances of futures prices of low-liquidity contract and the weight the leading contract take in shaping the price of low-liquidity contract-and thus we can focus on the effects brought by liquidity. Fortunately, all parameters estimated are statistically different from zero at 5% level, specially µ l . If µ l is known, the weight ϕ l then can easily be calculated. From the figures in the table, ϕ l is calculated to be 0.0219, 0.0201, 0.0162, 0.1469, 0.2927, and 0.1947 in order, clearly that the leading contract takes a more important position in commodities such as fuel oil, nature rubber and soybean NO.1 than metal commodities. The price of the leading contract of the metal commodities only takes up about 2% in weight. While for natural rubber, the influence is as high as 29%, and for fuel oil and soybean NO.1, the weight is not low too, 14.69% and 19.47% separately. The reason for leading contract not taking a significant position in metal commodities as in other commodities is that the difference in trading volume between high-and low-liquidity group is not as great as that between the groups in other commodities. In other words, even though they are divided into the low-liquidity group, these contracts have relatively active transactions. It means that the direct transmission mode plays a dominant role for these metal commodities, while the direct and indirect transmission mode have joint influence. Furthermore it indicates that information transmission mode may have something to do with trading activity significantly. Besides, the most appropriate and effective leading contract turns out to be the nearest contract for all commodities after we try all the high-liquidity contracts, and this is surprising because the nearest contract is normally not the most active one. It implies that it is the nearest contract that catches the most of market information quickly and effectively in the high-liquidity group and thus has the greatest strength in shaping the price of low-liquidity contract, not the most active one.
In table four, we can see not much have changed from table three. The leading contract remains unchanged, the variances almost stay steady, and the varying µ l seems to have a mean of the constant µ l in model two. It proves the robustness of the extended model. One fact stands out is that the more far the futures contract is, the more important the position the leading contract takes. This is the case for all commodities regardless of the magnitude of importance. In other words, as the contract in the low-liquidity group grows near, the leading contract decreases its significance. In the extreme case, as the low liquidity contract becomes active and turns into high-liquidity contract, it is only influenced by spot price. These results agree well with our assumptions and analyses in the preceding part.
In table five, we substitute market futures prices data with theoretical data derived from the pricing model, and the other aspects are the same as model three. Obviously, little has changed because of this modification. The estimation of parameters and the maximum likelihood value stay stable.
It signifies the soundness of our models in depicting real futures markets.
To see the term structure more clearly, we obtain the figures below. For simplify, we base them on model three, as we analyzed above, the differences among the extended models do not change the term structure essentially.
From the figures above, we can clearly see that neither the term structure of interest rate nor the term structure of convenience yield is monotonous. For the term structure of interest rate in figure 1 , it is monotonously increasing for the high-liquidity contracts and the trend does not continue for the low-liquidity contracts. There is a slight decline compared to the original curve, and the more important the leading contract is in shaping prices, in other words, the more dominant the indirect information transmission mode is, the more distinct the decline is. It means that the indirect information transmission mode has the power of pulling back the impact of interest rate, not resulting in an overestimating situation as in the classic models. As for the term structure of convenience yield shown in figure 2 , similar results are received that the term structure is decreasing until reaches the low-liquidity contract in which a light increase occurs. Likewise, the more significant the indirect information transmission mode is, the more evident the deviation is from the original curve. In this way, unlike the classic model, our model can be applied to a more complicated description of futures markets and is more applicable and feasible.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Unlike traditional literature in the realm of futures pricing or related area, this paper reviews pricing models of futures contract from a new angle, and takes into account factors such as liquidity and information transmission channel to form an extended model. In current literature, the classic pricing model is two-factor or three-factor model which sets the implied interest rate follow CIR process, so the impact of interest rate can only increase along with time to maturity, i.e., the influence function is monotone increasing. However, the term structure should be diversified. Therefore, liquidity is considered for pricing futures contracts for the first time, contracts with different maturities are treated discriminatively, leading to two kinds of information transmission mode: the direct mode and the indirect one. And then we find out how these two modes work and the related characteristics as we will list later. In this way, hopefully we will understand the price relation in futures markets better.
In order to support this conception, we first take advantage of the well known three-factor model for futures pricing under the assumption that futures prices follow the affine form. Then we take into consideration the liquidity factor and divide the contracts into two groups, namely, high-and low-liquidity group according to their open interest and trading volume. Finally, four models are generated. Model one is the benchmark model in which the three-factor model is utilized to price the high-liquidity contract, within which the parameters estimated are used in the following models. Model two is meant to evaluate the low-liquidity contract by introducing the liquidity factor, and it uses one high-liquidity contract as the leading contract to specify the impact the highliquidity contract has on low-liquidity contract. Model three is not that much different from model two for the only adjustment is that the weight of the price of the leading contract is not a constant any more but a variable of time to maturity. And in model four, we substitute the historical futures prices data with theoretical data to assess the robustness of the extended models. Under the arbitrage-free equilibrium condition, the influence functions A(τ ), B(τ ) and a(T ), b(T ) are determinate as the parameters involved are estimated with Kalman filter, and so are the term structures of interest rate and convenience yield.
The results show that most of these parameters are significantly different from zero. First of all, we notice that each commodity has its own implied interest process, and it behaves as an endogenous variable and varies from different commodities, unlike real market interest rate. Second, the weight of the price of leading contract varies among commodities too. The price of the leading contract of metal commodities only accounts for about 2%. While for natural rubber, the influence is as high as 29%. It means that the direct transmission mode plays a dominant role for these metal commodities, while the direct and indirect transmission modes have joint influences for other commodities, especially for natural rubber. One more interesting founding is that the leading contract tends to be the nearest contract not the most active contract. It indicates that in spite of the not so active transactions, the nearest contract is more effective in catching market information and passing it to low-liquidity contract. Third, the more far the futures contract is, the more important the position the leading contract takes. This is the case for all commodities regardless of the magnitude of importance. It implies that as the contract in low-liquidity group grows near, the leading contract decreases its significance. Furthermore, as the low liquidity contract becomes active and turns into high-liquidity contract, it is only influenced by spot price. Fourth, in model four the estimation of parameters and the maximum likelihood value stay stable, and thus the robustness of the extended models stand. Fifth, from the figures, we find that neither the term structure of interest rate nor the term structure of convenience yield is monotonous as classic model suggests. The extended model displays its power by pulling back the force of interest rate and convenience yield to portray a more complicated situation. In this way, unlike the classic model, our model can be more applicable and feasible.
By these modifications we implanted in the extended model, our model can be applied more realistically. It can help speculators and hedgers or even regulators to understand futures markets better, to diminish deviations from their anticipation to real values when they try to build price relationship theoretically. In this way, market participants can reduce trading friction and form more mature and robust futures markets, and regulators can detect price anomalies more easily. Considering the existence of indirect information transmission, when the authority tries to build a new derivative market based on futures market, they may want to build it on these high-liquidity futures contracts to avoid the two channel pricing bias. Maybe better modifications can be utilized to form a better description, so ongoing study is still in effect.
